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Abstract 
 
The catchword “compliance” dominates the 
actual debate about Identity Management and 
information security like few before. Companies 
need to comply with a variety of internal and 
external standards and regulations like the US SOX 
act. Identity Management is seen as a main 
provider of compliance in modern companies. 
However, its organisational aspects are 
underestimated in many projects, lacking a 
comprehensive approach to introduce in-house 
Identity Management. This work is based on the 
experiences gained from industry projects using 
Identity Management functionalities to strengthen 
security and to reach a high level of compliance. We 
develop a structured process-oriented methodology 
for introducing an Identity Management 
Infrastructure for organisations using drivers from 
IT security management to evaluate, rank, and 
implement subprojects. The methodology consists 
of an iterative process which enables even large and 
unstructured organisations to reach a suitable and 
profitable level of Identity Management by 
emphasising on organisational aspects rather than 
taking a merely technical approach. 
 
1. Introduction and Motivation 
 
Identity Management (IdM) is one of the most 
challenging topics in today’s modern society. The 
secure and efficient administration of numerous 
personal attributes that make up digital identities is one 
of the key requirements in open and closed networks. 
Identity Management in open networks like the 
Internet has received remarkable attention throughout 
the last years with researchers focussing on Identity 
Federations based on different open standards. In 
addition to that, projects like FIDIS 
(http://www.fidis.net/) or PRIME (https://www.prime-
project.eu/) flesh out the importance of IdM for the 
society. Although considered important, Identity 
Management in closed networks, however, has not 
gained comparable significance within the research 
community. The lack of academic penetration on the 
one hand and experience gained in industrial projects 
on the other hand were the major motivation for 
performing this research.  
Our engagement in different IdM projects has 
revealed the need for careful planning and a 
modularised introduction of an in-house Identity 
Management Strategy and Infrastructure. Together 
with an international company employing over 35.000 
users, we started to introduce IdM as a means to meet 
information security and compliance demands. A 
methodology was derived showing the necessary steps 
to introduce IdM and supporting the project team in 
planning the implementation of further IdM modules. 
Coming across the same problems within other 
organisations, independent from the companies’ size or 
class of business, we experienced the need for a 
reference model to cope with Identity Management in 
a structured and company-wide manner. This led us to 
the development of an approach for the introduction of 
IdM which is presented in this paper. Our goal is to 
provide a reusable process-oriented reference model 
for IdM in closed networks that takes recurring 
organisational issues into account and therefore is 
generally able to assist companies in their Identity 
Management issues. 
Organisations today are getting increasingly under 
pressure to control, manage, and audit their 
information flows. We experience a new level of taken 
precautions, officially certified processes, and strategic 
changes in IT having their roots in information security 
issues, legislative acts, or pressure from customers and 
partners. Among the most known drivers for changes 
in IT and information control systems are the U.S. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 [1], Basel II [2], 
BSI Grundschutz [3], the Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament [4], ISO IT Security standards 
(such as ISO 27002), and internal regulations. The 
effort to conduct business and manage IT systems in 
accordance with these standards and demands is called 
compliance. 
Addressing the major aspects of computer- and 
information security, which are confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability, is of paramount importance 
for getting compliant. Especially in respect to 
confidentiality and integrity, the users themselves, 
rather than popular external threads like viruses, 
phishing, or pharming attacks represent the main risk 
[5]. As a result of incorrect account management and 
inadequately enforced security policies users 
accumulate a number of excessive rights within the 
organisations’ IT systems over time, violating the 
principle of the least privilege [6].  
Identity Management is a means to reduce such 
risks, representing a vital part of a company’s security 
and auditing infrastructure [7]. Based on processes, 
policies, and the used technology, the aim is to restrict 
and control access to resources and identify all actions 
by their issuer. In addition, IdM strengthens security 
through stronger authentication, enforcing least 
privilege and thereby minimising potential misuse. 
Identity Management itself consists of various modules 
starting with Single-Sign-On (SSO), secured 
provisioning processes, and more. It is often seen as a 
merely technical approach but looking closer, the issue 
is indeed a strategic decision - affecting security, 
human resource provisioning, process flows, 
organisational structures, and software license costs.  
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, 
related work is presented, organisational aspects are 
addressed and drivers for Identity Management are 
analysed. Section 3, subsequently, introduces IdM 
technologies. Section 4 explains the developed 
reference model for introducing Identity Management 
in organisations. Finally, conclusions and future work 
are given. 
 
2. Related work and basic definitions 
 
2.1. Identity Management 
 
In particular big companies have to deal with a large 
amount of digital identities accessing their information 
systems. We define the term identity according to [8] 
as a subset of attributes or characteristics of an entity 
which make the entity, e.g. a person, uniquely 
identifiable within a set of entities. Electronic 
representatives for physical individuals are needed to 
administer users, grant permissions and control, 
regularise, and protocol their actions. In practice users 
often do not own only one single identity, but several 
identities in order to work with the productive 
applications. Every identity has its own access 
information and has to be created, maintained and 
erased separately. This situation results in a so called 
identity chaos in many organisations which needs to be 
faced by implementing a centralised Identity 
Management Infrastructure (IdMI). The IdMI 
represents the realisation of the defined processes and 
policies using adequate technical measures. 
 
Figure 1. Identity Management environment 
 
Identity Management has grown up over the last years 
and established itself as a core component of enterprise 
security management. It has evolved into an integrated, 
comprehensive framework, based on three pillars: 
Processes, well-defined policies and used technologies 
(as shown in Figure 1). Influenced by organisational 
and technical drivers, it deals with the storage, 
administration and usage of digital identities during 
their lifecycle. This covers rather simple tasks like 
automatic allocation and revocation of user resources, 
i.e. Windows accounts. However, it also includes 
sophisticated duties like role development on an 
organisational level. Practical experience has shown 
that the usage of roles and role patterns bears 
significant improvements in the area of user 
management as administration overhead and IT-risks 
are reduced [9]. The role concept assigns users to roles 
based on their function within the organisation instead 
of allocating access rights directly to them. The roles 
themselves are connected with access rights to certain 
resources [10]. A large body of work has gone on in 
the last years in this area covering different role 
models, administration concepts and role development 
strategies. However, going into detail about role-based 
IdM is out of scope of this paper and will be 
researched in our future work. 
 
2.2. Organisational aspects of IdM 
 
Before presenting technical components in chapter 
III, this sub-chapter focuses on the organisational side 
of IdM. Processes and policies valid within the 
organisation form the basis for a subsequent 
implementation of Identity Management. According to 
given strategic goals, they regulate the usage of 
electronic identities and their possible actions within 
the systems. Organisational Identity Management has 
to address security issues in order to build a stable 
basis and gain management commitment for IdM 
technologies like infrastructural elements, functional 
modules or connectors. Controlled and compliant 
processes and policies are needed to make 
technological measures efficient and meaningful.  
Identity Management processes deal with user 
management, organisational as well as technical 
approval workflows, and escalation procedures. They 
form the main administrative workload as they 
comprehend the management of the whole user 
lifecycle. Besides IT-resources, responsible managers 
are affected by Identity Management processes. In 
terms of information security, proper analysis and 
representation of the processes play the central role for 
reducing the number of security breaches and possible 
risks. After their definition, technical and 
organisational approvals are mapped to the IdM 
workflow module in order to empower the managers to 
allow or deny user requests using a central 
administrative component. Furthermore, the existence 
of escalation plans is a mandatory aspect of Identity 
Management. Processes that define emergency 
procedures ensure ongoing system operation in case of 
technical malfunction, unexpected process delays or 
policy violations.  
In order to regulate identity-related information 
flows and processes, policies have to be defined, 
consolidated and harmonised on different levels within 
the organisation: Process-level, IdM-level, IT-level or 
global level. Their grade of abstraction is dependent on 
their scope: Within Identity Management, for example, 
policies express regulations for user management 
processes, delegation issues or general security 
requirements. Abstract IT or global security guidelines 
are essentially direction-giving documents in an 
organisation defining the broad boundaries of 
information security. In contrast to that, policies at the 
process-level need to be implemented within the 
workflow component of an IdM solution and are 
therefore more system-specific. 
However, political problems accompany the 
definition and enforcement of policies and processes as 
human factors play an important role in the process of 
policy definition and consolidation [11]. Factors like 
data ownership or the fear of future restrictions caused 
by a modern and comprehensive IdM solution makes 
policy-related tasks a time-consuming, 
communication-intensive and crucial challenge for the 
project team. 
 
2.3. Drivers for Identity Management 
 
Investigating the drivers for Identity Management 
from figure 1, one can distinguish between technical 
and organisational aspects. Technical goals could be 
security, scalability, system performance, and process 
automation while organisational aspects stem from the 
management perspective and include an overall 
increased security level, lower system administration 
costs and more efficient user administration processes.  
Looking at driving forces for high level 
management commitment reveals compliance and 
increased information security as central drivers for the 
introduction of IdM. Closely related with each other, 
national and international law together with internal 
guidelines force enterprises to be able to provide proof 
of evidence about who has access to vital data within 
the companies’ information systems and who has 
granted permissions to whom. Central IdM 
functionalities, like automated user management, are 
able to address these requirements and support 
organisations in becoming compliant. Implementation 
projects like [12] and popular studies [13] show that 
major security risks arise because of staff gaining 
unauthorized access to resources as a result of 
manually handling user accounts. Moreover, user 
management processes are rarely documented and 
most of the time carried out differently. Application-
specific rights management increases security risks 
within the organisation and complicates 
comprehensive auditing tasks.  
A good example for neglecting organisational 
aspects is the implementation of a Single-Sign-On 
solution in combination with strong password policies. 
If the necessary reorganisation of the provisioning 
processes is not taken into consideration, it remains an 
ineffective stand-alone solution, at least regarding 
information security. If employees that left the 
company months ago still have access to their user 
accounts, the Single-Sign-On system does not improve 
information security: The former employees are still 
able to get unauthorized access to internal data. This 
prime example shows that both, provisioning and 
deprovisioning processes, have to be optimized and 
enforced, so that additional measures on the technical 
level are able to unfold their full potential.  
3. Technologies of Identity Management 
 
Some years ago, stand-alone SSO modules or meta-
directories quite often already were branded with the 
term Identity Management. Lately researchers as well 
as software vendors have realised that companies need 
more than just one or two single functional 
components to solve the identity chaos: Organisations 
need a comprehensive, integrative and standard-based 
Identity Management Infrastructure that contains 
several functional modules each serving a different 
purpose [14]. In addition to that, the emerging demand 
for sharing identity information between organisations 
results in a greater need for standardized data exchange 
channels. State-of-the-art identity federation therefore 
must rely on open standards, such as the XML-based 
protocols SAML [15] or SPML [16], essentially 
connecting different IdMIs. However, federation is out 
of the scope of this paper and will not be discussed in 
further detail.  
The IdMI presented in figure 2 is an output of one of 
our industry projects with the overall goal to provide a 
structured view onto technical Identity Management 
within the enterprise. It reveals Directory Services, 
User Management, and Access Management as the 
central IdM modules. 
 
Figure 2.  IdMI within an organisation 
 
3.1. Directory services 
 
Directory services provide synchronised information 
about users and resources forming the fundament of a 
comprehensive IdMI. The main challenge for the 
central data repository is to integrate user- or resource 
information from different target systems in a timely 
and consistent manner. This can be done by using 
either meta- or virtual directory technologies. Meta 
directories utilise connectors or agents to exchange 
data with the target systems and store the information 
by creating a copy in a central repository. The virtual-
directory approach omits resulting redundancies by 
only storing pointers to the pieces of information in the 
target systems without working with physical copies.  
 
3.2. User Management 
 
The data provided by the directory services is 
facilitated by other functional IdM components like 
User Management, Access Management or exchange 
of user information across organisational borders. User 
Management deals with the process of managing the 
digital identities throughout their lifecycle, starting 
with the creation of accounts, the maintenance, i.e. by 
processing change requests, up to the deactivation or 
termination. It can be split into an administrative and a 
provisioning component. The latter includes the 
allocation and revocation of accounts or resources (IT 
and non-IT). When electronic identities are no longer 
needed, e.g. after employees left the organisation they 
are deactivated by a de-provisioning process. This way 
the provisioning system ensures that access rights of 
inactive users are locked or revoked immediately and 
reduces security vulnerabilities. 
From an administrative point of view a delegation 
concept allows for passing on administrative rights to 
local persons in charge. The final step of this 
decentralisation process is a Self-Service component 
which enables users to alter their personal details on 
their own or request several resources without 
involving administrative staff. 
 
3.3. Access Management 
 
Together with the User Management and the 
directory services, an Access Management component 
is the third main module of an Identity Management 
Infrastructure. It deals with the authentication and 
authorisation of users, controlling access to connected 
resources. State-of-the art solutions are able to work 
with roles [6], granting access to information based on 
roles rather than individual IDs. Modern SSO modules 
incorporate different methods of authentication 
including passwords, digital certificates, and hardware 
or software tokens. Relying on global and local 
security policies, Access Management components 
also include Password Management and 
synchronisation as well as web or enterprise SSO 
functionality. 
4. Introducing Identity Management 
 
After pointing out the basic organisational and 
technical concepts and components of IdM, this 
chapter presents a method for setting up an IdMI and 
integrating it into the existing IT-infrastructure of an 
organisation. Our approach alters and extends an 
existing model [17] that is used for implementing an 
enterprise directory. The proposed methodology 
(figure 3) is not intended to be a project-management 
strategy but a rather generic high-level approach that 
considers special IdM requirements. One main purpose 
is to emphasise the need for organisational 
restructuring throughout the whole implementation 
process. Based on our project experience a technical 
approach that neglects the management side is leading 
to a situation where developed processes and policies 
remain unused and theoretical while on the other hand 
a solely management focused approach disregards 
central implementation issues like integration problems 
between different Identity Management modules. 
 
4.1. Model overview 
 
The complexity of the IdM components and the 
interaction together with the large amount of target 
systems and digital identities that have to be 
administered in big companies enforce a step-by-step 
introduction of an IdMI. On the one hand the policy 
and management side has to set up processes, and 
handle organisational issues while technology and 
architecture on the other hand have to focus on 
integrating and testing new functionalities within an 
existing IT-infrastructure. This dual concept needs to 
be taken into consideration as it is crucial for the 
development of Identity Management in general.  
Based on two pillars (technology/architecture and 
policies/management) our approach consists of several 
process loops (from hereinafter called subprojects), 
each representing the implementation of one single 
IdM module (e.g. a provisioning component). Single 
process loops can differ in their complexity and length 
depending on the functionality and its cross 
connections with other loops. Complex Identity 
Management modules like a global user directory 
usually are implemented in a more time consuming 
subproject compared to the rather straightforward 
rollout of a user Self-Service functionality. The IdMI 
implementation is guided by a global strategy (top box, 
figure 3) that is influenced by long-term drivers and 
goals. In the centre of our model three basic process-
steps form a subproject for implementing a single IdM 
module:   
• Step 1: Subproject planning, preparations, and 
requirements engineering. 
• Step 2: Development of (integration) processes and 
policies. 
• Step 3: Technical integration into existing 
infrastructure, enhancement of policies and 
processes. 
 
Figure 3. Structured Approach for IdM 
 
During one subproject it is likely that the 
implementation team has to loop back and refine 
previous work after coming up against problems. If 
e.g. throughout step 3 the project team realizes that 
needed policies haven’t been defined in the 
development phase (step 2), they have to go back, 
create the policy, and complete the remaining tasks of 
step 2 for this policy. After successfully completing 
one subproject the new module enters the IdMI 
Maintenance in which administrators have to deal with 
everyday’s issues such as fixing minor bugs, adding 
some functional extensions (like scripts) or adapting 
the module to new hardware devices. 
 
4.2. The Identity Management Strategy 
 
One special characteristic of Identity Management 
projects is their strategic, trans-organisational 
alignment crossing the boundaries of single IT-
systems. This integrative orientation enforces the 
existence of a global Identity Management Strategy 
that has to be developed before the individual 
components can be deployed. This strategy defines the 
sequence of implementation, the structure of the IdMI, 
and has to provide a stable organisational environment 
and commitment for the project itself. Besides general 
definitions, business and technical drivers together 
with the associated goals interact with the Identity 
Management Strategy. This way factors that are 
gaining more and more importance within the 
company influence the organisation’s IdM goals and 
the global long term strategy. The current movement 
within risk management and governmental regulations 
e.g. requires comprehensive auditing and controlling 
capabilities within the IdMI. Therefore, the 
organisation might have to change the implementation 
sequence, introducing an auditing module earlier, and 
postponing the implementation of a SSO component. 
In general, the presented functional modules of an 
IdMI as seen in figure 2 have to be analysed for how 
they could assist in order to reach the current Identity 
Management goals.  
 
4.3. Subproject planning, preparations, and 
requirements engineering 
 
The first step of a subproject affects both, the 
management and the technical side of Identity 
Management in the same way. One key task is to 
define the scope of the subproject technically and from 
a business point of view and thereby frame which 
goals have to be achieved within this iteration. Basic 
preparations include the appointment of a project team 
and allocation of responsibilities. The requirements for 
the actual subproject are defined according to potential 
previous iterations and the overall system and process 
architecture which is specified in the global Identity 
Management Strategy.  
The most important task in step 1 is to bridge the 
gap between the long term strategy and the short term 
project work. In our use cases this first process-step 
also included tasks like setting up contact with vendors 
of IdM solutions. On a technical level this helps the 
IdM team to get to know the capabilities of available 
solutions. While tasks like the allocation of 
responsibilities and the listing of affected policies are 
mainly located on the management side, staff 
responsible for the technical issues has to make a list 
of all information systems that are affected during the 
actual iteration. Possible interdependencies between 
other active process loops have to be taken into 
consideration. Looking at step 1 from the information 
security perspective leads to tasks like defining the 
possible risks related to the current subproject, i.e. 
which new security issues arise, which risks can be 
minimized or at least are reduced by the module that is 
to be implemented. The management side has to figure 
out business risks, while technicians have to deal with 
security risks that stem from the module integration, 
the potential usage, and exchange of identity data 
among connected IT systems. 
 
4.4. Development of (integration) processes 
and policies 
 
After the subproject planning has been finished, 
integration processes, new IdM related processes, and 
policies have to be developed in the next phase. The 
main goals of this step are the refinement and 
transformation of the results from step 1 in order to 
bridge the gap between high-level subproject goals and 
the actual software implementation. The organisational 
basis for step 3 is set up by concretising requirements, 
analysing the actual processes and policies, re-
engineering, and documenting them subsequently.  
 
 
Figure 4. Developing the organisational 
basis for an IdM module 
 
Figure 4 particularises the second step of a 
subproject and shows the different kinds of process 
and policy states that organisations face: 
Undocumented, documented, as well as new processes 
and policies that have to be defined and enforced in the 
context of IdM. Knowledge about existing processes 
and policies that are undocumented has to be made 
explicit in an as-is documentation. Afterwards a re-
engineering phase tries to optimise the current state 
and generate the to-be documentation which is needed 
for further technical system planning and architectural 
decisions. These tasks require communication on the 
organisational side of the project while the definition 
of integration processes that structure the linkage 
between the new component and existing systems, is a 
mainly technical issue. Such architectural decisions 
and basic system planning has to be conducted in order 
to ensure a seamless integration of the new Identity 
Management module into the existing IT-
infrastructure. An enterprise directory e.g. has to 
maintain bidirectional communication channels with 
each connected subsystem. For the exchange of 
identity information XML schemes usually have to be 
developed as different attributes are normally called or 
spelled differently throughout the involved systems.  
From an organisational point of view, the IdM team 
has to figure out how existing policies are affected by 
the new component and which new policies have to be 
defined during its implementation. According to the 
requirements given, all involved parties, i.e. not just 
the management, have to agree upon a consistent 
definition, the scope of each policy and the point 
where it is enforced. The processes and policies that 
are created form the basis for enforcing security 
measures and therefore reducing the risks and getting 
compliant. One policy could e.g. require that the 
currently implemented provisioning system has to log 
all administrative activities regarding account creation, 
maintenance and termination and store the information 
within a separate database. This has to be defined by 
the management but enforced by the module in 
question. Hence an issue of major importance in step 2 
is the interaction and the collaboration of the technical 
and the organisational pillar.  
 
4.5. Technical integration into existing 
infrastructure, enhancement of policies 
and processes 
 
Technically spoken, step 3 represents the actual 
functional enhancement of the IdMI. In the previous 
steps the project team has defined how and where 
identity information has to be synchronised or 
provided for the new module and where new policies 
and processes have to be implemented. Therefore, the 
main technical task of this step is testing the 
component and ensuring the seamless integration into 
the existing IdMI. A test environment in which the 
new functionality can be reviewed in detail has to be 
set up. In addition to that, a roll-back plan has to be 
developed to ensure business continuity. This task is of 
paramount importance, because the management 
support for the Identity Management itself is going to 
decrease in case of dysfunction of the IdMI and even 
faster decrease if the users cannot continue with their 
everyday’s work.  
On the organisational side the technical integration 
is accompanied by a process and policy adaptation. It 
is of major value that not just the functionality of the 
productive IT-Systems is ensured. In addition, the 
affected business processes also have to be reviewed 
for further enhancement in terms of Business Process 
Re-engineering. The IdM team has to communicate 
with stakeholders (end users, administrators, etc.) in 
order to get feedback if the new functionality is 
accessible and works properly. Furthermore, the 
project team needs to check if all implemented security 
policies are fully enforced. This can be done by 
investigating audit logs or identity data within the 
repositories. Step 3 is closely related to the following 
IdMI Maintenance phase. After one subproject is 
finished, the new component enters the maintenance 
phase and needs to be monitored for potential 
problems and enhancements. 
 
4.6. Practical experiences 
 
After investigating the IdMI implementation 
process, this chapter closes by presenting some 
practical experiences. Our project work has shown that 
it is e.g. a quite common situation that different 
subprojects of our model coexist. During testing and 
setting up connections between data repositories as 
part of the meta-directory roll-out, the IdM team 
already was dealing with the implementation of a 
provisioning component. Nevertheless, it seems 
rational to take interdependencies between single 
functional modules into consideration when planning 
an Identity Management roadmap. We found it very 
useful to start an IdM project with the introduction of a 
global user repository which stores identity data of all 
employees. Currently one industrial partner is 
following the proposed approach and working on the 
second iteration of the model after completing the roll-
out of a meta-directory. During the first iteration of the 
model suboptimal user management became obvious. 
We experienced e.g. certain ignorance for the 
documentation and re-engineering of existing 
processes in the context of IdM. However, it is of 
paramount importance to have a reliable process and 
policy documentation before the actual implementation 
of an IdM module is carried out.  
5. Conclusion 
 
The paper contains a structured approach for in-
house IdM. It is our goal that this approach develops to 
some reference model which could help analysts and 
parties involved in IdM projects to better plan and 
structure their efforts. In general, an IdMI is 
implemented with the global aim to get compliant and 
reduce risks during user handling. Nevertheless, many 
organisational problems slow down the development 
of a comprehensive IdMI. Applying our reference 
model and considering the managerial as well as the 
technical aspects helped to better organise future work 
and delegate sub-tasks to persons in charge. From our 
experiences we know about the applicability of the 
proposed approach, but it turned out that following it is 
an intensive and time-consuming “political” task in an 
organisation as different stakeholders have to agree 
upon standardized workflows. 
Focussing on information security and compliance, 
this paper has shown the importance of in-house IdM. 
The introduction of a global user directory at one 
project partner led to the identification and deletion of 
numerous orphan accounts. Centrally available and 
consistent user data now gives administrators an 
overview over all the electronic identities independent 
from different naming conventions in the connected 
sub-systems. This was a big step further because the 
initial situation with local identity silos made it 
impossible to bring together information about the 
users’ accounts in an automated way. No one within 
the company was able to present a list of an 
employee’s accounts in order to give evidence about 
his access rights within the IT systems. Obviously, this 
situation didn’t comply with the mentioned legal 
regulations.  Our project partner is currently working 
on the roadmap for integrating global provisioning into 
the IdMI. For future work we will monitor our user 
partner’s IdM implementation closely. Several studies 
are scheduled to assure ongoing compliance. 
Investigating the implementation of role-based user 
administration will be the main aspect of our future 
work. Especially the process of role-development is 
going to be researched in detail.  
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